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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
---------------------------------------------------------------x 
BORN TO ROCK DESIGN INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff, 
-against-
CAFEPRESS.COM, INC., 
Defendants. 
---------------------------------------------------------------x 
DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
McMahon, J.: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The questions presented by Defendant's summary judgment motion are (1) whether 
Defendant infringes Plaintiffs BORN TO ROCK trademarks when it prints designs that 
incorporate the phrase "Born to Rock" on T-shirts and other merchandise at the request of its 
customers, and (2) whether Defendant is entitled to the defense of trademark "fair use." 
For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The parties I 
Defendant Cafepress Inc., fonnerly known as CafePress.com, Inc., ("CafePress") operates 
a virtual online marketplace that allows its users to set up virtual "shops." CafePress users 
upload graphic designs to the CafePress.com website; by doing so, the users grant CafePress a 
license to "design, produce, market and sell" products bearing the users' designs. 
The following facts are undisputed, except where noted. The Court does not acknowledge purported 
"disputes" that amount to no more than legal argument. 
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Once the design is uploaded, the website causes it to appear on images of merchandise, 
such as (otherwise blank) T-shirts, coffee mugs, or key chains. Visitors to the CafePress.com 
website can browse designs, and if they find a design they like, they can select the kind of 
merchandise they would like printed with the design. Once a visitor places an order, CafePress 
prints the design on the selected merchandise and ships it to the customer. CafePress collects the 
payment, a portion of which is remitted to the CafePress.com user who created and uploaded the 
design. (See generally Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement ("Def.'s 56.1") ~~ 1-3; Plaintiffs 
Local Rule 56.1 Statement ("Pl.'s 56.1") ~ 1, Ex. 22; see also Pl.'s 56.1 ~ 63.) The parties 
sometimes refer to CafePress' business as a "print-on-demand service. II 
Plaintiff Born to Rock Design Incorporated C'BTR") owns trademarks that it says 
CafePress infringes through its print-on-demand service. In particular, BTR obtained a 
trademark for the words BORN TO ROCK, Reg. No. 1,846,642 in Class 15 for electric guitars, 
in 1994. (Def.'s 56.1 ~ 13; PI.'s 56.1 ~~ 13,28.) BTR's founder and current owner (who is also its 
attorney in this action) explains that he patented a new kind of neck for electric guitars, and 
selected the BORN TO ROCK mark in order to market his design. (PI.'s 56.1 ~~ 24-28.) He also 
affirms that "the BORN TO ROCK guitar brand has attracted valuable goodwilI," and supports 
that statement with exhibits that show use of the BORN TO ROCK brand name in numerous 
guitar publications. (Id. ~~ 37-39; Ex. 3.) 
B. The dispute 
BTR alleges that Cafe Press infringes its trademarks by selling merchandise bearing 
designs uploaded to the CafePress.com website that incorporate BTR's marks. 
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Since at least 2003, CafePress.com users have uploaded designs to the website that use 
the phrase "Born to Rock," either alone or in conjunction with other words or images. (Def.'s 
56.1 ~ 4l The following designs are some (but not all) of those that BTR alleges infringe its 
mark: 
If 
Bom to rock. 
BORN TO ROCK 
WhatAr,VouAppantl,com 
Born to be 
a rock star 
7CI'l:€;ilTtV€XO", 
In any case where there is a dispute as to whether the words 'born to rock' are being used as a trademark or 
as a non-source-identifying phrase, I represent the words as follows: "Born to Rock." This graphical choice does not 
reflect a legal conclusion. 
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BORN TO ROCK 
RIRCBJ m WORK 
&orn '0 Roel 
11 12 1 
.et. 2 80(0 to Rock! :bul forced 10 work, 
9 3 aNt 8 4 
7 6 5 
• Bom to rock.. 
(Def. 's 56.1 ~ 12.) BTR points out that it also objected to other designs, one of which simply 
uses the words "Born to Rock" in an unadorned block font on an otherwise blank T-shirt. (See 
Pl.'s 56.1 ~ 11.) 
BTR, meanwhile, uses its BORN TO ROCK trademark in conjunction with the following 
unregistered logo: 
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(Def.'s 56.1 ~ 14; Pietrini Decl. Ex. 1.) This logo appears in exhibits showing BTR's website, as 
well as T-shirts and guitar picks BTR sells on its website. BTR points out that it also uses the 
words "Born to Rock" in the absence of its logo, such as on invoices it sends to customers. (See 
Pl.'s 56.1 ~ 14, Exs. 9, 27.) 
Finally, in an attorney's affidavit, made on "personal knowledge," CafePress asserts that 
it "has collected and produced a substantial amount of evidence of third party use of the phrase 
'born to rock' on apparel and for music related goods and services." (Pietrini Decl. ~ 11.) None 
of that evidence is included in the record on this motion. 
C. Litigation history 
On May 19,2009, BTR sent a letter to CafePress asking it to remove user designs that 
contain the words "Born to Rock" from the CafePress.com website, citing its Class 15 trademark 
registration of the mark for use in conjunction with the sale of electric guitars. (Id. ~ 5; PI.'s 56.1 
~ 5.) On May 26,2009, CafePress responded by asking BTR to specify which designs BTR felt 
infringed its mark; on June 23, BTR responded with links to several designs it found 
objectionable. (Def.'s 56.1 ~~ 6-7; Pl.'s 56.1 ~~ 6-7.) 
On June 25, 2009, CafePress formally responded to BTR's cease and desist letter, and 
informed BTR that it would not remove the designs from its website, relying on, among other 
things, the doctrine of fair use. The parties exchanged additional emails until September 8, 2009, 
when CafePress informed BTR that it would not change its position. (Def.'s 56.1 ~~ 8-9; Pl.'s 
56.1 ~~ 8-9.) 
The parties did not communicate for over a year. Then, on September 13,2010, BTR 
wrote CafePress to demand once again that CafePress remove designs from its website that BTR 
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believed infringed its trademarks. This time, BTR relied on a second trademark, Reg. No. 
3,843,978, in Class 25 for liT-shirts," which the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") issued 
to BTR on September 7, 2010. (Oef.'s 56.1 ~~ 10,13; PI.'s 56.1 ~~ 10,13.) On September 17, 
2010, CafePress informed BTR that it had removed some, but not all, of the designs to which 
BTR had previously objected, and would not remove the others for the reasons discussed in its 
earlier correspondence. (Oef.'s 56.1 ~ II; Pl.'s 56.1 ~ 11.) 
Rather than debate the issue further, BTR filed the complaint in the instant action on 
November 17,2010. (Oef.'s 56.1 ~ 11; Pl.'s 56.1 ~ 11.) BTR asserts claims for trademark 
infringement and false designation of origin (ECF No. I (Complaint), Counts I and III), and 
trademark counterfeiting (Id., Count II). 
Following discovery, CafePress filed the pending motion for summary judgment. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Summary judgment standard 
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no "genuine issue of material fact" 
and the undisputed facts warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). On a motion for summary 
judgment, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574,587 (1986). 
Whether any disputed issue of fact exists is for the Court to determine. Balderman v. U.S. 
Veterans Admin., 870 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1989). The moving party has the initial burden of 
demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
323 (1986). 
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Once the motion for summary judgment is properly made, the burden shifts to the non-
moving party, which "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The nonmovant "may not rely on conclusory allegations or 
unsubstantiated speculation," Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998), but must 
support the existence of an alleged dispute with specific citation to the record materials. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). 
While the Court must view the record "in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party," Leberman v. John Blair & Co., 880 F.2d 1555, 1559 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), 
and "resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against 
whom summary judgment is sought," Heyman v. Commerce and Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 
1320 (2d Cir. 1975) (citations omitted), the non-moving party nevertheless "must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec., 
475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted). Not every disputed factual issue is material in light of the 
substantive law that governs the case. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of 
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
B. Trademark infringement (Counts I and III) 
In Counts I and III of the Complaint, BTR asserts claims for trademark infringement and 
false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125. The elements ofBTR's prima 
facie case are the same under each provision. GMA Accessories, Inc. v. Croscill, Inc., 2008 WL 
591803, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3,2008) (citing cases). 
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1. ETR's primafacie case 
CafePress first argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because BTR has failed to 
make out its prima facie case for trademark infringement. CafePress is incorrect. 
To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, BTR must establish the following: (l) that 
it has a valid mark that is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act; and that (2) CafePress 
used the mark, (3) in commerce, (4) in connection with the sale or advertising of goods or 
services, (5) without BTR's consent. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 
406-407 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a» (other citations omitted). 
In addition to these elements, BTR must show that CafePress' use of the mark "is likely to 
cause confusion ... as to the affiliation, connection, or association of [CafePress] with [BTR], or 
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [CafePress'] goods, services, or commercial 
activities by [BTR]." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A»; see also KP Permanent Make-Up, 
Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004); Gruner + Jam v. Meredith Corp., 
991 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1993); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309,316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). Likelihood of confusion exists where "numerous ordinary prudent purchasers are likely 
to be misled or confused as to the source of the product in question because of the entrance in the 
marketplace of defendant's mark," or "are likely to believe that the mark's owner sponsored, 
endorsed, or otherwise approved of the defendant's use of the mark." S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. 
Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188,205 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Playtex Prods., Inc. v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2004» (other citations omitted). 
CafePress concedes for the purpose of its motion that a reasonable jury could find in 
BTR's favor on every element of its prima facie case, except one. Of particular importance, 
CafePress assumes that a jury could find that BTR has valid trademarks that are entitled to 
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protection (CafePress Br. at 10 ("CafePress is not contesting validity in this motion"»; and 
CafePress declines to argue that BTR cannot show a likelihood of confusion.3 
CafePress argues that, nevertheless, it is entitled to summary judgment because BIR has 
not presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that CafePress "used" BTR's mark "in 
commerce." CafePress argues that it does not use the words "Born to Rock" in commerce when 
it displays the words on its website, for instance in connection with its search function. When a 
visitor to the website types "Born to Rock" into CafePress' search function, a page will appear, 
displaying the phrase in connection with identifYing designs and merchandise. The page may 
show pictures of designs that incorporate "Born to Rock," and links that read "Born to Rock 
gifts" or "Born to Rock I-shirts." (See, e.g., Pl.'s 56.1, Exs. 13(a), 19(a).) CafePress argues that 
under recent caselaw addressing the issue of "use in commerce," CafePress' presentation of the 
words "Born to Rock" in these circumstances does not meet the threshold use in commerce 
requirement. See 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407; Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 
123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
CafePress is being facetious: it is undisputed that it imprints the designs on merchandise 
and ships that merchandise to customers. (See Def.'s 56.1 ~~ 1, 4; PI.'s 56.1 ~ 43; Defendant's 
Counterstatement ~ 43.) That activity constitutes "use in commerce." 
The Lanham Act defines "use in commerce," in relevant part, as follows: 
For purposes of this Chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce 
(l) on goods when -
Despite conceding trademark validity, CafePress relies on several cases that stand for the proposition that 
descriptive marks that lack secondary meaning are not entitled to trademark protection. See, e.g., Grupke v. Linda 
Lori Sportswear, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 987, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F.Supp. 
1357, 1360·61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Court will not fashion these citations into an invalidity argument that 
CafePress does not deem worth presenting on this motion. It is not the Court's role to second-guess CafePress' 
litigation strategy. 
9 
Case 1:10-cv-08588-CM   Document 90    Filed 09/07/12   Page 10 of 17
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the 
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if 
the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on 
documents associated with the goods or their sale, and 
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and 
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services 
and the services are rendered in commerce ... 
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (quoted in 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407). 
Under the foregoing definition, "use in commerce ... on goods" is readily apparent in 
CafePress' print-on-demand business. CafePress "uses" the words "Born to Rock" "in 
commerce" when it "place[s]" the words "on the goods," such as T-shirts, that CafePress imprints 
with its users' designs. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. "The goods are sold and transported in commerce" 
whenever the imprinted merchandise is sold and shipped to CafePress' online customers. As 
noted, it is undisputed on this motion that CafePress sells merchandise bearing the phrase "Born 
to Rock." (See Def.'s 56.1 ~~ 1,4; Pl.'s 56.1 ~ 43; Defendant's Counterstatement ~ 43.) 
Thus, a jury could find this element of BTR's prima facie case satisfied regardless of 
whether CafePress also "used" the BORN TO ROCK mark when it displayed that phrase 
elsewhere on its website (or in its source code, or in its "URL" or "metatags") in response to 
search results within its website. The sort of "use" discussed in the search provider context is 
simply irrelevant in cases, like this one, where the alleged infringer physically places the mark 
on goods that it sells to its customers. 
This evidence of "use in commerce," in combination with the concessions identified 
above, makes out BTR's prima facie case of trademark infringement. Thus, CafePress' motion 
for summary judgment on the infringement claims must be denied unless it has established its 
fair use affirmative defense as a matter of law. 
10 
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CafePress makes several argwnents that confuse or conflate the concept of "non-
trademark use" (which is part of the affirmative defense of fair use) with the element of "use in 
commerce" (which, as discussed, is part of the prima facie case). See 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 
412. But "use in commerce" is not the same thing as "trademark use," as those terms are used in 
the statute. "Use in commerce II is a defined element of section 1114 and 1125 claims. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (defining "use in commerce"). It is only after a "use in commerce" has been 
established along with the remaining elements of an plaintiffs prima facie infringement case -
that one can logically reach the affirmative defense of fair use found in section 1115(b)( 4). See 
infra. There, the statute refers to "use" of a mark "other than as a trademark, II and it is from this 
language that the fair use concept of "non-trademark use ll has developed. It is thus possible to 
have "use in commerce" that is not a "trademark use" for purposes of the fair use defense. When 
such cases arise, the defendant's "non-trademark use" is an element of the fair use defense - not a 
deficiency in the plaintiffs prima facie case. 
Since a jury could find a "use in commerce" based on CafePress' print-on-demand 
business, its argwnents regarding "trademark use" are appropriately addressed to its fair use 
defense, to which I now tum. 
2. Fair use 
"Fair use" is an affirmative defense to a claim of trademark infringement. See generally 
KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at Ill. "A junior user is always entitled to use a descriptive term in 
good faith in its primary, descriptive sense other than as a trademark." Cairns v. Franklin Mint 
Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 2 McCarthy on Trademark and Unfair 
Competition § 11.45 (4th ed. 2001)). As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has put it, "This 
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defense 'is based on the principle that no one should be able to appropriate descriptive language 
through trademark registration.'" Packman, 267 F.3d at 639 (internal citation omitted). 
The Lanham Act fair use defense is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), which applies 
when the alleged infringer establishes that "the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an 
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark . .. of a term or device which is descriptive of 
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party .... " 15 
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (emphasis added).4 
"In other words, 'fair use permits others to use a protected mark to describe aspects of 
their own goods.'" Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (quoting Car Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & 
Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995)). It is not necessary that the plaintiffs mark be 
classified as "descriptive" to benefit from the fair use defense. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 322; see 
also Bell v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1260 n.15 (S.D. Cal. 2008). 
Rather, the central considerations are whether the defendant has used the phrase "(1) other than 
as a mark, (2) in a descriptive sense, and (3) in good faith." Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 2012 WL 
701262, at *2 (quoting EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 
F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added); Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 322. 
As the Supreme Court explained in KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 111, because fair use is an 
affirmative defense, it can be established notwithstanding that some possibility of consumer 
confusion will arise from a defendant's good faith, descriptive use of a mark: 
Since the burden of proving likelihood of confusion rests with the plaintiff, and 
the fair use defendant has no free-standing need to show confusion unlikely, it 
follows ... that some possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with 
fair use, and so it is. The common law's tolerance of a certain degree of confusion 
4 
"While fair use is an express defense to claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, courts have extended it to claims 
under 15 U.S.c. § 1125 as well." Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 2012 WL 701262, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012) 
(internal citation and alteration omitted). 
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on the part of consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an 
originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the 
undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a 
descriptive term simply by grabbing it first. The Lanham Act adopts a similar 
leniency, there being no indication that the statute was meant to deprive 
commercial speakers of the ordinary utility of descriptive words. "If any 
confusion results, that is a risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify 
its product with a mark that uses a well known descriptive phrase." 
Id. at 121-22 (internal citations omitted). 
As noted, the first element of the fair use defense is that CafePress made only "non-
trademark use" of the phrase "Born to Rock" on the T-shirts it printed and sent to its customers. 
A "trademark use" involves an indication of the source or origin of the goods. See Dessert 
Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Thus, "A 'non-trademark use of 
[a] phrase' is evident where 'the source of the defendants' product is clearly identified by the 
prominent display of the defendants' own trademarks.''' Kelly-Brown, 2012 WL 701262, at *3 
(quoting Cosmetically Sealed Indus .• Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28,30-31 
(2d Cir. 1997)). The fact that a phrase is used in a descriptive sense also suggests a non-
trademark use. Id. 
In Kelly-Brown, 2012 WL 701262, at * 1 - a case on which CafePress relies the 
defendant only used plaintiffs mark in combination with other clear source identifiers for the 
defendant's product. There, plaintiff registered as a mark the phrase "Own Your Power." Later, 
Oprah Winfrey's "0" Magazine used the phrase to promote an event, and printed the phrase 
"Own Your Power" on the cover of the magazine. The District Court found that the plaintiff 
would not be able to overcome a fair use defense, as a matter of law, and dismissed the 
complaint. In doing so, he observed that the magazine cover and event promotions included 
other clear source identifiers, establishing non-trademark use of the "Own Your Power" phrase: 
13 
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Defendants argue that they used the Phrase in its descriptive sense and not to 
indicate the source or origin of the goods (the Magazine and the Event). The 
source of the Magazine was clearly identified by the prominent, and distinctive 
"0" trademark followed by "The Oprah Magazine.1t The fact that Oprah herself is 
pictured on the cover of the Magazine further identifies the source of the goods. 
The prominent display of Magazine's trademark ItO" also identifies the Phrase as a 
headline that, along with the other text on the cover, describes the contents of the 
Magazine. 
The 0 Magazine was also identified as the source of the Event, and the Phrase 
served to describe the Event's theme. Promotional materials identified the Event 
as: "0, The Oprah Magazine's first-ever own your power event in celebration of 
the October issue cover story,1t which involved "a lively panel discussion about 
power featuring some notables from this issue's Power list." Since the 
promotional materials clearly identified The 0 Magazine as the source of the 
Event, the Defendants' use of the Phrase in relation to the Event was not a 
trademark use. 
Id. at *3 (citing Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628,639 (7th Cir. 2001)) (internal 
alterations omitted); see also Arnold v. ABC, Inc., 2007 WL 210330, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 
2007); B & L Sales Associates v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 298 F.Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
Here, the only record evidence that goes to the element of "non-trademark" use are 
pictures of the allegedly infringing designs. For some of these designs - for example, a T-shirt 
bearing the phrase ItBorn to Rock" and nothing else - there is no potential source identifier other 
than the words that constitute BTR's mark. Assuming - as CafePress does for purposes of its 
motion that the BORN TO ROCK mark has acquired at least some secondary/source 
identifying meaning, a reasonable juror could conclude that the use of the phrase "Born to Rock" 
was intended to identify BTR as the source of such aT-shirt. 
Of course, a juror might look at another of the T-shirts - for example, the one that depicts 
a rocking chair and says, "Born to Rock" and conclude that the phrase is used only 
ornamentally, and not to identify the T-shirt's maker. Or there might be some other element of 
the T-shirt - a tag, for example - that identifies the source in the same way that "0" magazine 
14 
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did in Kelly-Brown. Indeed, in some of the designs pictured in the record, a source other than 
BTR is clearly indicated - by the name of a website that appears on the uploaded design. But 
there are other designs - for example, designs that include guitars and the words "Born to Rock" 
- which do not contain any obvious indicium of a source other than BTR, and which (because of 
the their use of guitars) might logically be thought to emanate from BTR. 
Here, CafePress' litigation strategy upends its cause. By failing to move for summary 
judgment on a design-by-design basis, CafePress essentially asks the Court to take judicial notice 
of that fact that every use BTR complains of is a non-trademark use as a matter oflaw. I cannot 
do that based on the evidence proffered in support of this motion. Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to BTR, CafePress is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its 
affirmative defense. 
The cases on which CafePress relies are like Kelly-Brown, the Oprah case: in each, the 
defendant's use of a descriptive phrase was accompanied by clear indicia of the source of the 
goods. See, e.g., Packman, 267 F.3d at 629; Bell, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1259; cf. B & L, 298 F. 
Supp. at 910-11. None of the cases cited to me found, as a matter of law, that the use of some 
phrase is a non-trademark use for no other reason than that phrase has a commonly understood 
descriptive or ornamental connotation. None of the cases supports CafePress' position that it has 
satisfied the first element of its fair use defense, as a matter of law, for each and every allegedly 
infringing design. 
The most closely analogous case cited to the Court is 3 Point Distribution LLC d/b/a 
Ezekiel v. CafePress.com, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17128, at * 1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008), 
which involves very similar claims brought against CafePress by the owner of a mark who 
objected to having it printed on goods through CafePress' service. Plaintiff there registered the 
15 
Case 1:10-cv-08588-CM   Document 90    Filed 09/07/12   Page 16 of 17
mark EZEKIEL for use on clothing. As here, CafePress printed user designs that included the 
word "Ezekiel" on T-shirts and other merchandise, and the plaintiff complained that doing so 
violated its trademark. 
Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting CafePress from distributing 
products bearing the EZEKIEL mark. In the course of granting that motion, the Central District 
of California concluded that the plaintiff was likely to succeed in defeating CafePress' fair use 
defense - effectively the same defense CafePress offers here. Id. at *21-24. Other than to point 
out differences in the procedural postures, CafePress has no answer to this case. 
Because reasonable jurors could disagree on (at least) the first element of CafePress' fair 
use defense, its motion for summary judgment on BTR's infringement claims (ECF No.1, 
Counts I and III) must be denied. There is therefore no need to examine the other elements of 
CafePress' fair use defense. 
C. Trademark counterfeiting 
CafePress also moves for summary judgment dismissing BTR's claim for trademark 
counterfeiting. However, because the case will proceed to trial in any event on the trademark 
infringement claims - and the same evidence will be presented for all claims - there is no need 
for the Court to pass on the viability of the counterfeiting claim at this point. CafePress will be 
free to renew its motion at the close of the evidence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to terminate the 
motion at ECF No. 25 from the Court's list of pending matters. 
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The parties will proceed to trial. The final pre-trial conference will be held on September 
17,2012, at lOam in Courtroom 14C, 500 Pearl S1., New York, NY. Trial will commence the 
following morning. The parties are advised to consult my Individual Rules in anticipation of the 
conference and the trial. 
Dated: September 7, 2012 
U.S.D.J. 
BY ECF TO ALL COUNSEL 
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